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 Title:  A Framework of Conditions of Success for Earned Value Analysis in Projects  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Earned Value Analysis (EVA) is a method that has gained traction in some business sectors to 
report project progress and help control performance.  Yet the literature reports mixed results 
as to its effectiveness in helping deliver successful projects and, additionally, much of the 
previous studies on the topic is conceptual in nature focusing on the design of the EVA system.  
We therefore extend knowledge on EVA by analysing the impact of EVA on the levels of 
success of two projects that utilised the method.  This is done through the prism of agency and 
organisational justice theories.  A framework is proposed of EVA conditions of success, 
incorporating both design and operational aspects of the EVA system.  The framework is used 
to develop testable propositions that can guide further research into the effects of EVA-based 
systems on the creation of agency-related characteristics in the project environment that are 
conducive to project success.    
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1. Introduction 
An effective performance measurement system (PMS) is a key element to achieving 
organisational effectiveness (Updadhaya et al., 2013).  It needs to encompass all key actors 
(Jääskelainen et al., 2014) and facilitate collaboration where multiple parties are involved 
(Pekkola and Ukko, 2016).  In many outsourced project environments, the key actors come 
together in a temporary organisation, with multiple parties often comprising of different 
companies that work together for the common good of the project.   
 Two key criteria of project management (PM) success that are typically measured by 
the PMS in such environments are the extent to which the project is delivered to cost and to 
time; with performance typically being measured quantitatively in terms of: adherence to, and 
variance from, baselined budgets (cost) and schedules (time).  Traditionally the PMS would 
comprise of two separate and un-linked systems, one focused on the budget and one on the 
schedule.  This lack of integration between the two systems is a potential weakness in terms of 
quality of the feedback given to the project team.  For example, the cost-based data might show 
that the project is over-spending, yet without cross-reference to the time-based data, which 
might be difficult and cumbersome to do, given that it will be held in a completely different 
system, the reason for the over-spend is not immediately clear.  It could be that the project is 
in trouble in terms of adhering to the budget i.e. the work scheduled was completed to plan but 
cost more than was originally estimated.  Alternatively, it is in trouble in terms of adhering to 
the schedule i.e. the cost estimates were accurate but there was less work done than planned.  
A similar lack of clarity can exist when trying to understand the reasons for and the implications 
on the budget of a lack of progress against the schedule.   
It is in response to these shortcomings that Earned Value Analysis (EVA), a method 
that utilizes a distinct set of metrics and analysis tools, has gained traction in many business 
sectors.  EVA brings together the cost and time-related data and integrates them into one metric: 
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the Earned Value (EV).  Hence it gives a more complete picture as to the reasons for and 
consequences of over-spend, under-spend, early and late delivery.  In doing so, it potentially 
passes one test of a well-designed PMS, which is to align at both the strategic and operational 
levels (McAdam, et al., 2014).  It does this by providing detailed information at the project 
level, useful for managing the day-to-day activities, whilst also providing information of the 
overall performance of the project, through reporting the EV, which is particularly useful for 
those at a strategic level above the project.   
Yet EVA-based performance measurement is far from being universally adopted in all 
projects and, whilst there are reports of its effectiveness (see, for example, DeMarco et al., 
2009 and Chou et al., 2010), there are also reports that highlight negative outcomes of using 
EVA (i.e. Vargas, 2003 and Lukas, 2008).  In addition, with some notable exceptions, there is 
still a paucity of empirical studies focused on the experiences of using EVA on live projects 
and an over-reliance on anecdotal data when selling its benefits.  Much of the recent EVA 
literature is conceptual in character, looking to refine and extend, with illustrative examples or 
simulations, the EVA techniques (see, for example, Chen et al., 2016, Acebes et al., 2015, 
Colin, et al., 2015 and Narbaev and De Marco, 2014).  Whilst such work is worthy, the need 
for empirical work on the topic provides a rationale for this paper, which seeks to answer the 
research question: What are the conditions of success for EVA-based methods for performance 
measurement in project environments?   
In terms of the empirical-based research reported in the paper, the focus is on performance 
measurement in project environments involving more than one organization/company working 
together in some way.  Such projects can be particularly complex and problematic from a PM 
point of view, partly due to the nature of the relationship between two key stakeholders: the 
client and the contractor, who reside in different organizations (Owen and Linger, 2007).  In 
these project environments social and relational aspects add a layer of complexity in terms of 
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undertaking performance measurement, as such projects create coalitions (Winch, 1989) made 
up of temporary multi-organizations (TMOs) (Cherns and Bryant, 1984).  In a TMO, the project 
team comprises of people that differ not only in their roles and responsibilities but also in their 
affiliation to different companies.  Overcoming the differences is a further challenge to meet 
for effective performance measurement to take place. 
To address the research question we view the use of EVA-based methods in such 
outsourced projects through the theoretical lenses of agency theory and organizational justice 
theory.  Given our study’s emphasis on the crucial role of the relationship between the dyad of 
client and contractor, agency theory appears to provide a suitably firm alternative theoretical 
anchor for our research.  In addition, our study has novelty by using a second theory, namely 
organizational justice, to support the analysis of the conditions for success of EVA in such 
project environments. 
In the next section of the paper we present a review of the literature relating to the 
agency problem in these projects, the role of organizational justice, and the potential of EVA 
to address the agency problem.  We then provide an illustrative example of EVA.  Section 3 
outlines the research method.  It provides an overview of the rationale and the sampling 
procedure for the case study methodology selecting the two cases that utilized EVA and the 
method of data collection and analysis.  Section 4 contains a summary of the two project case 
studies, one taken from construction and one from clinical research.  Section 5 provides a cross-
case analysis in relation to the use of EVA, viewed through the lenses of agency theory and 
organizational justice theory.  Section 6 presents the results derived from the data analysis and 
section 7 details a framework of EVA conditions of success comprising of design-related and 
operations-related conditions.  The concluding section (8) states the contribution of the study, 
its limitations and proposes areas for future work.    
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The agency problem in projects 
Many projects involve clients and vendors from different companies and create 
potentially difficult to manage principal-agent relationships – leading to the so-called “agency 
problem”.  A principal-agent relationship exists where there is a contract by which a person 
“the principal” engages another person “the agent” to perform a service on his or her behalf; 
and which involves the delegating of decision-making authority by the principal to the agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In such projects, the principal is in an owner (client) organisation 
and the agent is a different project (contractor) organisation (Turner and Műller, 2004).  (In the 
remainder of the paper, the terms “client” and “contractor” denote principal and agent, 
respectively, in an outsourced project environment.  The term “outsourced project(s)” denoting 
those where the principal and the agent reside in different companies.) 
Agency theory has proved useful in facilitating understanding of a variety of non-
project specific outsourcing environments.  See for example:  Zhang et al., 2015; Van der Valk 
and Iwaarden, 2011; Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Ruth et al., 2015; Gorla and Somers, 2014; 
Chen and  Anandhi, 2009; Taylor, 2007; Lamminmaki, 2011; Gefen et al., 2008; Liberatore 
and Wenhong, 2010; Handley and Gray, 2013.  Hence, our confidence that it would provide 
useful insights relating to the use of EVA for measuring performance in outsourced projects.  
The theory is concerned with resolving the agency problems that can exist in 
principal/agent relations.  For example, in some project contexts, a high degree of conflict over 
the goals of the project between the client and contractor exist, resulting in dysfunctional 
agency relations, which in turn can lead to unnecessary costs, delays, mistrust, concealment of 
information and win/lose gaming.  Given that the contractor may have more information than 
the client might have about project issues and progress etc., referred to as “information 
asymmetry” (Eisenhardt, 1989), mistrust may again build up.  Particularly on the part of client 
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relating to the perceived appropriateness of decisions being made by the contractor, referred to 
as the “adverse selection problem” (Turner and Műller, 2004).  There may also be opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the contractor if they decide to act on information not shared in ways 
that are not beneficial to the client.  Such opportunistic behaviour is a fundamental assumption 
of agency theory, where people act in their own self-interest.  Which is referred to as the “moral 
hazard problem” (Turner and Műller, 2004).  In this context, they act in the interest of their 
own company at the expense of the project.   
Early work in the 1970’s and 1980’s on developing agency theory focused on the 
“contract” as the unit of analysis (Melnyk, et al. 2004) and the various factors that influence 
the choice of contract.  For example, an early distinction is between outcome and behaviour-
based contracts, which is roughly equitable to the distinction between fixed and fee-for-service 
contracts.  With an early proposition of agency theory being that where the contract is outcome 
based – or the principal has information to verify the behaviour of the agent - the agent is more 
likely to act in the principal’s best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
Moving into the 1990’s there is recognition that other concepts besides the contract could 
be used as motivating and control mechanisms to address the agency problems – with one such 
concept being that of the metric.  Here, it is the metric, used in tandem with the contract, which 
allows the principal to manage and direct the activities of the agent and hence propositions 
relating to the development, selection, use and refinement of metric are developed (Melnyk, et 
al. 2004).  For PM this would mean a focus on the individual metrics, the sets of metrics and 
the PMSs used, within the context of a wider PM, as well as the contractual arrangements put 
in place.   
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2.2 Use of EVA for performance measurement 
The building blocks for EVA are those found in traditional PM approaches.  A list of 
deliverables needs to be constructed, which is a constituent of a planning process that results 
in a product-oriented work breakdown structure (Ruskin, 2004).  To illustrate this using a 
simple example, table 1 shows a list of 5 deliverables that make up a project to write a report 
on the attitudes and experiences of rail passengers travelling on two particular routes (Line A 
and Line B).  Corresponding to each deliverable is an estimate of how long it will take in days 
to produce, which is recorded in the 2nd column: Baseline [Days].  In the example, a daily cost 
of $160 is used.  Hence the total estimate for the cost of the project is the total number of days 
(23) x $160 = $3,680 – also referred to as the Budget at Completion (BAC).  Baseline costs 
can also be identified for each deliverable i.e. for the first one, 1,000 blank questionnaires 
produced, it is $160 x 5 days i.e. $800. 
 
Take in table 1 
 
 The next stage involves the creation of a dependency network, resulting in a baseline 
plan shown in figure 1.  This shows that the project will take 4 weeks and 2 days to complete, 
if everything goes to plan.   
 
Take in figure 1 
  
With these building blocks, EVA measures project performance (Raby, 2000).  Firstly, 
regular monitoring points are established and, in the case of the illustrative example, they are 
set at the end of each week.  At these points, those responsible for providing a deliverable 
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collect the following information: 1) how many days of work spent working on the deliverable 
2) how many days needed to complete the work and provide the deliverable.   
In table 1 and figure 1 the EVA calculations are given for the monitoring point (MP 
now) at the end of week 2.  Table 1 shows the information on work completed and left to do in 
columns 3 and 4.  A new calculation of the estimated cost at completion (EAC) can also be 
calculated - in this case it is now estimated to take 27 days rather than the original 23 days i.e. 
27 x $160 = $4,320 and revised costs for each individual deliverable can be generated, as shown 
in column 5 of table 1.  With the baseline plan frozen, as the tracking of progress takes place 
a, there is the creation of second plan reflecting the status.  This plan is shown in figure 1 and 
allows a simple visual comparison be made between the current and the baseline plan.  This 
highlights though the end of project milestones that the project will finish 2 days later than 
originally planned.  Next three EVA metrics are calculated; the PV, EV and AC.  Their 
definitions are as follows: 
 PV (Planned Value) – the budgeted cost of work scheduled at the monitoring point 
in time (MP now).  This being taken from the baseline plan and was previously 
referred to as the BCWS. 
 EV (Earned Value) – the budgeted cost of work performed at MP now.  Again, this 
is with reference to the baseline plan - referred to previously as the BCWP.  
 AC (Actual Cost) – the actual cost of work performed at MP now, previously referred 
to as ACWP. 
So, for example, at MP now, deliverable 1 was scheduled to be completed at a cost of 5 
days (in the baseline) at $160 per day, hence the PV = 160 x 5 = $800.  The deliverable has 
indeed been provided, so the full baselined value ($800) has been earned and the EV = $800.  
Yet it actually took 8 days to perform the associated work so the AC is 160 x 8 = $1,280.  For 
deliverables 2 and 3, work expected to have started at MP now, 2 days and 1 day respectively.  
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So the PVs are 320 and 160.  For deliverable 2 no work has been done, so the EV is 0.  For 
deliverable 3 the deliverable is 100% complete, so the EV = 1 x 160 =$160, though 2 day’s 
work were carried out, giving an AC of $320.  Deliverable 4 was expected to have 3 days of 
work undertaken by MP now, hence a PV of $480, yet it has not been started (EV = 0).  The 
last deliverable was not expected to have been started at MP now (PV = 0) and indeed that is 
the case (EV =0). 
In the example one previous MP (MP-1w) would have been passed, with the EVA 
calculations collected at that point and, hence, for reporting purposes those figures for MP now 
would be added to those for MP-1 (as shown in figure 2 below).  As the project progresses and 
each MP reached the PV, EV and AC would build up cumulatively.  In the example, at MP 
they are now $1,760, $960 and $1,600 respectively.   
The data from the EVA analysis is then typically put into graphical form to facilitate 
the communicate progress.  For the illustrative example, this is in figure 2.  The figure shows 
that against the baseline there is an underspend but that this is reflected in the fact that progress 
has been much slower than expected and indeed the graph predicts that if the current trend 
continues the project will actually be late and also over-budget.  In non-EVA PMS’s the 
information to make such a prediction will exist but might typically be held in different places 
and in different systems i.e. a scheduling system and cost control system.  Hence, it is not such 
an easy task to marry the two systems as it is with the EVA output shown in figure 2. 
 
Take in figure 2  
 
 Once the basic EVA metrics are derived a range of indices and ratios can be calculated.  
Amongst the most commonly used ones (with figures from the illustrative example included) 
are: 
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 Cost Variance (CV) = EV – AC = 960 – 1600 = -640 
 Schedule Variance (SV) = EV – PV = 960 – 1760 = -800 
 Cost Performance Index (CPI) = EV/AC = 960/1600 = 0.60 
 Schedule Performance Index (SPI) = EV/PV = 0.55  
 To Complete Performance Index [based on BAC] (TCPI) = (BAC-EV/BAC-AC) = 
(3680-960/3680-1600) = 1.31 
 
Negative CV and SV values reflect a lack of progress against the plan, as does a CPI less 
than 1.  The CPI is a particularly powerful index as it reflects how much it costs to earn one 
dollar of budget i.e. it is a value for money indicator (Wake, 2008, p. 25-29).  In the example 
0.60 means for every dollar spent the project is earning $0.60 or, put another way, to earn $1 
of value it costs $1.67.  The TCPI is also a useful index as it shows the uplift in cost 
performance required to complete the remaining work as per the baseline, with a rule of thumb 
being that once it goes above 1.1 such a shift in performance is difficult to achieve.   
In theory, using EVA mitigates for some of the agency problems highlighted earlier in the 
paper.  The sharing of the graphical outputs enables all parties to obtain a visual and easy to 
understand report as to the salient points re project performance (Chou et al., 2010).  Such 
graphical outputs, along with the simple EVA calculations, help to raise awareness of 
performance trends (Anbari, 2003).  This can reduce information asymmetry from the 
perspective of the client, leading to greater trust for the client.  As a method, its key advantage 
is the low level of effort required to track the performance of a project (Kerkhove and 
Vanhoucke, 2017).   
Trust on the part of the client that the contractor can deliver the project can also be enhanced 
by the role of the EVA metrics in providing an early warning system (Vanhoucke, 2011) and 
the reliability of the EVA system in reporting any deviations from the plan (DeMarco et al., 
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2009).  For example, parameters can be set, such as the CPI dropping below 0.9 that 
automatically trigger exception reports requiring some corrective action.  
Whilst in theory the use of EVA makes sense there are potential limitations and obstacles 
to its use.  These cover system, relational, organizational and cultural-related problems and 
highlight that the way EVA is both designed, integrated into other elements of the PM system 
and operated is important (Kim et al., 2003).   
In terms of limitations of EVA, there are literatures that focus on the method itself.  Much 
of the limitations focus on the deterministic project duration and cost forecasting formulae 
(Kim and Kim, 2014) and the fact that traditional EVA-based formulae for cost and schedule 
forecasting do not deal with uncertainty and do not provide information on a range of possible 
outcomes (Kim and Reinschmidt, 2010).  A further limitation is the assumption that each 
activity or costed element is independent (Kim and Ballard, 2002).  These limitations restrict 
the predictive power of EVA metrics, such as the PV (Chen, et al., 2016).  Hence, one area of 
attention has been to address the deficiencies by integrating EVA with other methods to deal 
with uncertainty and risk, such as fuzzy logic, exponential smoothing, logarithm linear 
transformation, non-linear cost profiling and reference class forecasting (Naeni, et al., 2011; 
Chen, et al., 2016; Warburton and Cioffi, 2016; Batselier and Vanhoucke, 2017).  Or else, by 
creating new EVA metrics, such as the Customer Earned Value (CEV) (Kim and Ballard, 2002; 
Kim, et al., 2016).  Such approaches seek to avoid unrealistic EVA metrics such as PV and 
BAC, which undermine the integrity of the method when reporting the EV.  For example, they 
build buffers into the initial planning that reflect uncertainty making the initial planning more 
realistic.  
In addition to limitations focusing on the EVA formulae, some of the obstacles to the use 
EVA stress the importance of the relationships between people both designing and using the 
EVA system.  There is a need for open communications between various project participants 
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and for the EVA system to treat people in an equitable, impartial and fair way in terms of 
assessing performance (Storms, 2008; Vargas, 2005).  This need for fairness in the design and 
operation of the EVA system highlights the potential important role of organizational justice 
in ensuring EVA contributes to successful PM.  In an outsourced project, organizational justice 
is about how the individuals in the TMO from the client and the contractor organizations 
perceive their treatment in relation to the measuring and rewarding performance.  
Organizational justice theory states there are three elements of justice that affect individual 
perceptions.  Firstly, “distributive justice”, which relates to the fair distribution of outcomes, 
such as payment for work undertaken (Greenberg, 2009).  Secondly, “procedural justice”, 
which relates to the processes and procedures used to make decisions (Luo, 2007).  Thirdly, 
“interactional justice”, which relates to the treatment of an individual on a personal level 
(Colquitt, et al. 2001).  Evidence suggests the most beneficial outcomes when all three elements 
of organizational justice are present (Colquitt, et al. 2005).  
Hence, one can posit that if the EVA system contributes to high levels of organizational 
justice amongst the individuals in the TMO then the EVA metrics will drive positive 
behaviours that will be to the benefit of the project.  For example, adopting fair procedures in 
delivering bad news shows positive responses from the individuals concerned, despite the bad 
news being shared (Richter, et al., 2016).  Furthermore, when there is a perception that 
procedures are fair, individuals are more likely to be open with and trusting of other people, 
which has a positive effect on co-operative behaviours between team members (Lui and Ngo, 
2004).    
 
3. Method 
The study adopted a qualitative research design involving two case studies.  Case based 
research is particularly appropriate in situations where there is little previous literature or prior 
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empirical evidence about a phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989a) – as with the topic of EVA 
implementation.  It is also an approach that has been previously utilized in operations 
management research to gain better understanding of aspects of project management (see, for 
example, Mello, et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2013; Verma and Sinha, 2002) and performance 
measurement (see, for example, Pellinen et al., 2016).  Therefore, using multiple case studies 
offers the prospect of developing a good understanding of the impact of using EVA in a project 
environment.  Having decided upon a multiple case study approach, the guidance provided by 
Stuart et al., (2002) on undertaking effective operations management/project management case 
research informed the specific research method adopted for the study.  
The unit of analysis was the outsourced project, with the project organisation being 
conceptualised as a temporary-multi-organisation (TMO) between client and contractor.   
3.1 Sample selection 
The sample comprised of two projects that utilised EVA to monitor progress on a day-
to-day basis, with one classed as “successful” from a PM point of view and one classed as 
“unsuccessful”.  PM success were defined as a multi-dimensional construct, which is consistent 
with the majority of prior literature on the topic, with dimensions being meeting time, cost, 
quality objectives and satisfying the client (Chipulu, et al. 2014; Shenhar, et al. 2001).  The 
case studies comprised one project from construction and one from clinical research.  These 
were appropriate to compare as the projects typically undertaken in both have well-defined 
methods (Turner and Cochrane, 1993) - a condition for using EVA.  They also typically involve 
the outsourcing of project work to an external supplier – as was the case for each of the two 
projects selected for analysis – so a principal/agent relationship was present for each.   Hence, 
whilst they provided very different products and services, they had much commonality in terms 
of the context and the requirements for PM and a PMS.  
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3.2 Data collection and analysis  
There were diverse sources for data collection, which enables data triangulation and 
enhances reliability (Barratt, et al., 2011).  Initially a complete picture of the wider macro-
environment in which each project was undertaken was painted.  It was important to understand 
activities undertaken before the project started and by other groups in the client organisations, 
such as contract management.   Hence, there were meetings held with the client representatives 
to gain a sound understanding of any strategic evaluation activities undertaken pre-contract 
award, the nature of the contract between the client and contractor(s) and the PM structures, 
systems and personnel in place prior to project execution.  As well as talking to clients, where 
appropriate, there was access given to the researchers of non-confidential documentation 
detailing the processes and procedures relating to the PM systems.  In addition, desk research 
was undertaken to collect secondary data in the public domain relating to the client and 
contractor organisations i.e. their ownership structures, markets, products, services etc. 
After gaining a sound understanding of the macro-project environment, data collection 
focuses on the execution stage of each project.  This took the form of semi-structured interviews 
with staff working for both client and contractor on the project including client and contractor 
project managers.  Various project documentation produced during execution were also 
analysed.   
The first stage of the data analysis involved initial sense making of each case.  This 
enabled an understanding of the variables that potentially shed light on the reasons for the 
different levels of project performance.  It also allowed for cross case analysis to be undertaken.  
Data held in the interview transcripts were analysed using a phrase as the unit of analysis.  To 
enhance reliability and validity two members of the research team independently coded the 
data.     
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4. Summary of case studies 
4.1 Airport Terminal Construction 
This project utilized EVA and was a successful from a PM perspective.  The client was 
highly satisfied with the outcome.  It finished on time, with the outturn cost perceived to offer 
a high level of value for money.  The scope was the construction of a new purpose built terminal 
that was part of a wider refurbishment programme.  The programme value was approximately 
$300 billion and the original cost for the project was $1130 million.  It would result in a 
terminal approximately 6 times larger than the existing terminal, complete with up-to-date 
facilities for the air traveller, including leisure and retail offerings.  The client was the owner 
of the airport and the contractor comprised of a joint venture between two contracting 
organisations.  A Managed Service Provider (MSP) appointed by the client provided a full 
client programme management service.  The MSP had a long-term contract to provide such a 
service to the client.  Incentivised contracts were let on a competitive basis.   The project 
duration from demolition of old terminal buildings to the opening of the new terminal was 5 
years.   
 An EVA Master Report presented the EV, AC, CPI and CV, as well as other EVA 
metrics, for the project as a whole, though the option to drill down and report on the EVA 
calculations for individual components was possible.  In order to ensure there was a minimum 
level of understanding there was extensive EVA training across the project team disciplines. 
Throughout the project, there was clear focus on taking timely corrective action when 
certain conditions arose.  These actions often triggered by the data held in the CPI, SPI and 
TCPI metrics.  The SPI was particularly useful in the early stages to ensure that any early 
serious slippage in time was rectified.  To achieve this the project team set a tolerance that the 
SPI should not fall below 0.8.  Similar tolerances were set for the CPI and TCPI. 
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There was a clear understanding of which work was critical to the overall completion 
of the project i.e. the activities on the critical path.  With particular attention paid to the EVA 
calculations relating to activities on this path.  As illustrated by a situation with one year left in 
the execution phase of the project when it became clear that the indicators (SPI etc.) were 
showing it unlikely that the project would be completed on time, unless dramatic changes were 
achieved in performance.  In response, the client introduced more incentives, including 
completion bonuses, as well as giving up the liquidated damages arising from previous late 
delivery.  These actions re-mobilized the project team and helped ensure the project completed 
to schedule.  
The attention given to the implementation of the EVA-based system was evident 
throughout its use.  A lot of time was spent on education and training of the TMO in relation 
to the whole PM process, including the use of EVA.  There was also recognition in the client 
and MSP organisations that some in the TMO saw the PMS as, at best, a necessary evil and 
that buy-in was needed to obtain data that accurately reflected the actual progress being made.  
To this end, there was time spent explaining and talking face-to-face with individuals and teams 
in the supply-side of the TMO about the benefits and reasons for collecting all the detailed 
tracking data to enable the EVA metrics to be derived. 
   
4.2 Haemophilia Drug Trial  
This project was an unsuccessful project as mid-way through, a breakdown in the 
relationship led to the cancellation of the contract by the client.  It also utilised EVA.  The 
client in the case was a small biotechnology company with limited in-house resource to conduct 
the clinical trial.  Hence, they outsourced the project to a Clinical Research Organization 
(CRO).  The project involved managing a series of clinical trials in healthy volunteers and/or 
patients designed to provide enough safety and efficacy data to obtain a licence in order to be 
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able to market the drug for the treatment of haemophilia.  The cost of the project was 
approximately $3m.  The project scope included the identification and monitoring of suitable 
patients.  The project was set up on a fixed price basis, through a competitive bidding process.  
The client and the contractor had not worked together before.  It was planned to be completed 
within a 22-month time period.     
 The client decided to adopt an EVA-based approach to monitor progress and to pay the 
contractor for work undertaken.  On a monthly basis, the client derived the EVA using data on 
progress provided by the contractor.  The metrics reported were PV, EV, AC and EAC, though 
indices were not calculated.  A deliverable classed as a certain percentage complete i.e. 50% 
triggered payment.   
This was the first time that the client and the contractor had used EVA.  There was no 
formal training provided and no activities linked to getting buy-in from the contractor to the 
approach by the client prior to starting the project.ni 
At a very early stage, the EVA metrics flagged up that the project was hitting problems.  
The EV was less than the PV and the AC was greater than the EV, so the deliverables were 
being provided slower than planned for in the baseline and those provided were costing more 
money to deliver than originally estimated.  Both parties were unhappy.  The client because 
they were not receiving the products they wanted on time.  The contractor because they were 
incurring additional costs in undertaking the activities, yet as payments were linked to the 
deliverables they were not being paid for the extra work undertaken.  As the weeks passed, the 
EVA metrics clearly showed that the problem was getting bigger: the SV and CV were both 
negative and the absolute value of both was getting larger. 
The response to the data from the PMS was a hardening of attitudes on both sides and 
an increasing impasse as to finding a solution to the problems that was mutually acceptable to 
both parties.  From the client’s perspective, the EVA metrics clearly showed that they were not 
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getting the deliverables as planned.  Hence, the client withheld payments to the contractor.  For 
the contractor the SV and CV were evidence of an unrealistic BAC and PV, which was, in their 
opinion, the result of the project being much more complex and difficult to deliver than 
originally thought.  The client’s response to this was unsympathetic, responding that the 
contractor had accepted the risk when signing the contract.  These opposing views were not 
reconciled.  With no agreement between the two parties on a strategy for getting the project 
back on track the client cancelled the contract.   
 
5.   Cross-case analysis 
Overall patterns are detectable between the two projects that, through the lenses of 
agency theory and organizational justice, provide indications of some of the conditions of 
success for the use of EVA.     
The project with the highest level of goal conflict was the Haemophilia Drug Trial.  
This high level of goal conflict was evident in some of the language used by participants, with 
references made to it being a “battle” and “bombardments” taking place in project meetings.  
The root cause of this conflict was an outcome-based contract which reflected a widely 
optimistic estimate of the costs to deliver the project and which made no allowance, in the form 
of a contingency budget, for uncertainty and risk.  The other project did not exhibit such goal 
conflict.  They paid great attention to dealing with uncertainty and risk by building “shock 
absorbers” into the program, basing the data produced from the EVA formulae realistic 
estimates. 
From the very start of the Haemophilia Drug Trial seeds were sown for agency 
problems to manifest; and as the project commenced, rather than addressing these problems 
the parties’ actions exacerbated them.  Indeed, the project played out in classic textbook fashion 
in terms of a dysfunctional Principal/Agent relationship, with the conflict leading to high 
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opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry.  The contractor failed to share 
information with the client, which might have helped to alleviate some of the client’s concerns 
and help address the low level of trust that was building up in the client organisation, and the 
high levels of concealment of negative outcomes on the part of both parties. 
The fact that EVA-based metrics was used on this project could be interpreted as 
evidence of its ineffectiveness and yet, if one looks at the level of information available to 
verify contractor performance it is clearly very high.   Such a condition is favourable in terms 
of delivering successful outcomes.  In agency theory, it is also suggestive of a positive 
relationship with the selection of outcome-based contracts, which was the case in the Airport 
Terminal Construction project.   Indeed, for both the projects, the PMS was highly effective in 
providing the client with the right information in a timely fashion to verify contractor 
performance.  EVA did its job in terms of acting as an effective set of metrics for performance 
measurement.   
The distinguishing feature between the two projects as to why this did not translate into 
project success and client satisfaction for both was in large parts down to the different responses 
of the client organisations.  In the Haemophilia Drug Trial the metrics flagged up very early 
the flaws with the contractor’s pricing model.  Hence exposing the inadequacies of the baseline 
budget and schedule.  Rather than addressing these flaws and inadequacies the client withheld 
payments for non-performance, as highlighted early on in delivery by the EVA-metrics and 
they insisted that the contractor bore all the costs associated with the realised risk of 
underestimating the costs of delivering the project.   
By comparison, on the Airport Terminal Construction the EVA highlighted similar 
issues of lack of progress mid-way through the project.  Here the response of the client was to 
write off a proportion of the penalty costs that the contractors had incurred and revise the 
contract to provide additional incentives to complete the work.  Here there was no strong 
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evidence of some of the other desirable factors to address the agency problem being present.  
Yet these did not prove problematic as the lack of information asymmetry, coupled with the 
extensive amount of information generated to verify contractor performance, meant the 
relationship between client and contractor, as reflected in the revised contractual arrangements, 
was resilient to instances of high threat.  
Viewed through the prism of organizational justice, there is clear differences in the PM 
conditions between the two projects.  Great attention given in the Airport Terminal 
Construction project to ensuring that the contracting organizations perceived the EVA system 
as fair.  In the words of one of the client staff members: 
“… the key is having the right behaviours and attitudes. … We’re not gathering data 
[using the EVA system] to beat them [contractors and suppliers] up, we are gathering data and 
analysing the data and providing valued outputs to the benefit of everybody.” 
In the Haemophilia Drug Trial a very different picture is painted relating to the 
interaction between client and contractor through the EVA system, as described by a client 
representative: 
“… they [the contractor] would bring all their people and you would get bombarded … 
At the end of the day you can just show them the [EVA] graph and just say “that’s fine  - but 
this is where we are”.” 
These two quotes demonstrate very different scenarios in terms of the dealings between 
individuals on a personal level, illustrating that interactional justice was high for the Airport 
Terminal Construction project and low for the Haemophilia Drug Trial.  
Procedural justice was high for Airport Terminal Construction project, achieved by the 
client spending time and money upfront on getting buy-in and a high and common level of 
understanding as to how the EVA system works, through training and user engagement of the 
contractor staff.  The Haemophilia Drug Trial did not undertake such activities, with the sense 
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in the contractor organization from the start that the new EVA system was imposed without 
any discussion or input from them and hence inherently unfair and loaded in favour of the 
client.  So by comparison procedural justice was low.   
The payment for work undertaken, which relates to distributive justice, was a major 
issue on the Haemophilia Drug Trial, with the contractor’s negative view of EVA being in part 
due to the fact that “it’s not working for us.”  The contractor’s viewpoint was that they were 
spending many hours on essential tasks, such as teleconferences, not explicitly linked to a 
deliverable.  Hence, the EV calculations did not recognise them and the client did not pay for 
them.  By contrast in the Airport Terminal Construction project the client recognised that the 
contractor needed to be fairly paid for work undertaken and that this involved ensuring that the 
definitions of “value” aligned both client and contractor perspectives.  By doing so, distributive 
justice was high, whereas it was low on the Haemophilia Drug Trial.   
 
6. Discussion 
In terms of the conditions of success for EVA, the experiences of the two projects in 
the case studies demonstrate the importance of both design-related and relational-related issues.  
In respect of the first of these issues, the two cases demonstrate the necessity of designing the 
PMS in such a way that the formulae used for generating the EVA data adequately deals with 
uncertainty and risk.  They highlight the necessity of the strand of recent EVA literature that 
seeks to integrate EVA with other methods to address this issue (i.e. Chen, et al., 2016; Kim, 
et al., 2016; Warburton and Cioffi, 2016; Batselier and Vanhoucke, 2017).  So, as clearly 
shown in the prior literature, a key condition of success for EVA is design-related.  Linking 
EVA data to payment schedules, with an outcome-based contract, and the problem is 
exacerbated.  Then, from the contractor point of view, the debate moves from one of project 
progress to being about payment for work done.   
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A second condition for success is the avoidance or quick resolution of agency-related 
problems.  A common and potentially destructive agency problem is goal conflict.  Through 
its visually arresting graphical reporting and use of indices that set clear parameters to trigger 
timely corrective action, the cases confirm that the method quickly raises awareness of 
performance trends (Anbari, 2003).  In addition, the two projects confirm the method is highly 
efficient and effective in terms of the level of effort required to track performance (Kerkhove 
and Vanhoucke, 2017).   
The EVA graphs, showing a small number of key metrics, alongside the judicial use of 
indices to set tolerances provide a highly effective and efficient early warning system of 
potential goal conflict in outsourced projects.  Using this approach proves to be effective in 
addressing another agency problem, high information asymmetry, that typically exists between 
client and contractor when outsourcing has taken place, regardless of whether the project is 
ultimately successful or not; with such a reduction in information asymmetry illuminating 
situations in which the client and the contractor are in conflict. 
The last condition for success illuminated by the two projects is the relation-related 
issues associated with the processes for designing and operating the EVA system.  Having a 
positive impact on performance is dependent on the EVA data helping to drive behaviours that 
contribute to the success of the project.  Such behaviours are more likely to be present when 
EVA leads to fair treatment of the contractor by the client.  Where there is a high level of 
organisational justice and its three elements: procedural, distributive and interactional, are 
present, such a scenario exists (Colquitt, et al., 2016).   
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6.1 Framework of EVA Conditions and Propositions 
Figure 3 shows the framework of EVA conditions for project success.  As discussed 
earlier in the paper, a combination of design-related and operational-related EVA conditions 
influence project success by helping ensure that favourable agency-related characteristics are 
present.  The agency-related characteristics shown in the framework combine elements of 
agency theory and organisational justice theory.   
 
Take in Figure 3 
  
The framework enables the derivation of a number of propositions.  The overall 
proposition (P1), as shown by the arrow between the EVA Conditions and Agency-related 
Characteristics is: A well-designed and well-operated EVA-based system for reporting project 
progress is more effective at ensuring the agency-related characteristics conducive to success 
are present than a non-EVA-based system.   
In terms of the design-related conditions in the framework, there are four derived 
propositions.  The first relates to the need for the EVA metrics to utilise methods for dealing 
with uncertainty such as fuzzy logic and exponential smoothing.  In doing so, the data generated 
is more likely to be an accurate representation of the actual performance of the project.  Such 
accurate representation helps addresses agency problems and hence P2 is: An EVA-system well 
informed by appropriate methods for dealing with uncertainty is more likely to address agency 
problems than one that is not.  P3 is: An approach based on a highly visual graphical reporting 
of EVA generated data is more effective in communicating progress than one based on 
reporting the values calculated through the EVA metrics; and such communication helps 
overcome agency problems.  This proposition suggests that a focus of EVA design needs to be 
on the mode of communication of the data between client and contractor and not just on the 
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generation of the data itself.  Linked to this is the fourth proposition highlighting the need for 
simplicity and clarity in choosing the EVA metrics and indices to report progress, so that the 
project is not drowned with irrelevant information.  Hence P4 is: A small number of simple 
EVA metrics/indices are more effective at communicating performance of the project, which 
will better address agency-related problems, than a large number that includes ones generated 
by complicated calculations.  The final design-related proposition, P5, is: EVA is most powerful 
as a means of control if it includes protocols to trigger payments for work done and that these 
triggers are aligned with the client’s perceptions of value; such alignment ensures the agency-
related characteristics conducive to success are present.  So there must be a clear link between 
the work undertaken and the outputs delivered to the client, as measured by the EVA system.  
The first of four propositions relating to the operation of the EVA system focuses on 
the crucial role of adequate training of all members of the project team, including the 
contractor, in the use of the system.  Hence P6 is: The EVA system operates most smoothly 
when the client invests in adequate training and awareness raising in the use of the system for 
all member of the project team; with such a smooth operation helping to ensure the agency-
related characteristics conducive to success are present.  P7 is: The EVA system is likely to 
remain most useful during project execution, and addressing agency-related problems, if a 
level of effort deemed appropriate by all project team members is expended in reporting 
progress through the system.  This is likely to be influenced by decisions made at the design 
stage, such as the number of metrics/indices used, and highlights the fact that interdependencies 
probably exist between the individual conditions.  For the EVA system to be effective it must 
be part of a wider system of project control.  This means that other parts of the project 
management system, such as the schedule, budget and contract, must be adaptable to changing 
circumstances.  Hence P8 is: The EVA system will be effective as a method for project control 
if there is the flexibility in other elements of the project management system to make changes 
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when the EVA system triggers a call for corrective action; acting on such calls is necessary to 
ensure the agency-related characteristics conducive to success remain present.  As well as 
being used to control, an effective EVA system drives desired behaviours amongst the project 
team members.  It is a moot point as to which is the most important element, a “control”-based 
EVA system or a “behaviour”-based one, which highlights that not only is the 
interdependencies between elements important but their relative strength of association with 
the agency-related characteristics.  In terms of driving behaviours the final proposition (P9) is: 
EVA generated data will only drive the desired behaviours of the project team members by the 
client when it is used for the fair treatment of individuals and organisations that make up the 
TMOs; such treatment is necessary to ensure the agency-related characteristics conducive to 
success remain present.  This aspect of the EVA is likely to be highly associated with 
perceptions of organisational justice, a concept recognised as leading to enhanced project 
performance.   
 In summary, the framework shows how agency-related characteristics, derived from 
agency and organisational justice theory, relate to project success. The framework further 
shows that conditions relating to both the design and the operation of the EVA method are 
antecedents to such conditions.  
 
6.2 Future work 
Overall, prior research into the use of EVA has produced mixed results in terms of its 
impact on project success.  Some have reported its positive impact, for example, DeMarco et 
al. (2009) and Chou et al. (2010) whilst others report a negative impact, i.e. Vargas 2003 and 
Lukas, 2008).  We believe that the future work would benefit from using the framework as a 
theoretical basis, enabling studies to consider not only design-related issues of EVA but also 
those relating to its operation.  Furthermore, the framework provides a theoretical lens of 
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agency and organisational justice that has the potential to explain any contradictory findings in 
relation to the impact of EVA.  Future work should validate the proposed framework with a 
particular focus being on a large-scale quantitative study.  Such a study would explore the 
propositions and test the strength of the relationships between the main constructs i.e. EVA 
conditions (design and operational), agency-related characteristics and project success and the 
strength of the interdependencies between items in the EVA conditions construct, would build 
on the research findings reported here. 
 
6.3 Practical implications 
Our research has practical implications, especially for client PM organisations that are 
utilising EVA with project teams involving different firms.  As clients seek ways to better 
monitor and control performance through the project execution phase, for those that have not 
used it before EVA is a potential option.  Yet guidelines to frame the design and operation of 
EVA are lacking.  Our framework highlights important conditions that need to be present to 
ensure the designed EVA system is fit for purpose, including its ability to recognise the inherent 
uncertainty in project environments, the power of visual-based reporting systems and a key 
metrics/indices and the need to integrate to payment mechanisms that reflect client perspective 
of value.  As well as seeking to establish these conditions, as shown in the framework client 
PM organisations should pay attention to operational aspects.  These relate to the training of 
the TMO members.  The budgeting for and then expending of appropriate resources to generate 
accurate data from the EVA system.  Using the EVA data to recognise and reward desired 
performance.  Finally, operating the system in such a way that the TMO perceive it to result in 
fair treatment for work undertaken and for behaviours beneficial to the project exhibited.    
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6.4 Limitations  
Our research has a number of limitations that future studies can address.  Firstly, our 
theoretical lens is that of agency and organisational justice.  Further research could incorporate 
other lens through which to view project success and then validate the EVA conditions of 
success through a modified and extended theoretical framework.  Secondly, we develop the 
framework from a synthesis of the literature and from the findings of two case studies.  This 
means that claims of wider generalisability of the results are not possible.  Further empirical 
study is required to test its wider validity, incorporating data from other project contexts besides 
construction and clinical trials.   
 
7. Conclusions 
EVA methods that are designed and operated in the right way seem to have an impact 
on agency-related problems.  Furthermore, agency and organisational justice theories help 
explain why one project that uses EVA is successful, whilst another project using the same 
approach is not.  We have attempted to extend the EVA-based body of knowledge by proposing 
a framework that comprises of conditions of success incorporating both design and operational 
aspects.  To focus exclusively on refining the design of the EVA, i.e. through a larger number 
of more complicated and sophisticated metrics and indices might not be the best approach to 
take in terms of enhancing the effectiveness of EVA, if such design considerations do not pay 
adequate attention to important operational aspects.  Indeed, such an approach might be 
counter-productive if a key condition of success relating to the simplicity and ease of use of 
the method is lost. 
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Deliverables Baseline 
[Days] 
Actual 
[Days] 
Left to 
complete 
[Days] 
Estimate at 
completion 
1 1,000 blank questionnaires 
produced 
5 8 0 8 x 160 = 1,280 
2 650 passengers surveyed Line A 2 0 2 2 x 160 = 320 
3 350 passengers surveyed Line B 1 2 0 2 x 160 = 320 
4 1,000 completed questionnaires 
analysed 
10 0 8 8 x 160 = 1,280 
5 Survey report written 5 0 7 7 x 160 = 1,120 
Total Days 23 27  
Total Cost $ 3,680  $ 4,320 
 
Table 1: Rail passenger survey example 
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Figure 1: Rail passenger survey - schedule and EVA calculations 
 
Figure 2: Rail passenger survey – EVA Graph    
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Figure 3: Framework of EVA conditions of Success    
 
